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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nicholas Blythe appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court
erred in denying Mr. Blythe's motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his shoes was
not a lawful search incident to arrest under State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017).

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 12, 2018, Officers Boardman and Fancuillo
stopped a vehicle for speeding and rolling through a stop sign. (7/10/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-24;
Tr., p.11, Ls.16-22.) Gabriel Parent was the driver and the owner of the vehicle, and Mr. Blythe
was the passenger. (7/10/18 Tr., p.25, Ls.21-22, p.26, Ls.6-7; Tr., p.11, Ls.16-22.) Mr. Parent
admitted to Officer Fancuillo that he had seven grams of marijuana. (Ex.Bat 2:25-45; 7/10/18
Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) Officer Fancuillo ordered Mr. Parent out of the vehicle, searched his
pockets, and handcuffed him. (Ex.Bat 2:45-4:25; 7/10/18 Tr., p.22, Ls.11-25.) Officer Fancuillo
found a pill in Mr. Parent's shoe. (Ex.Bat 3:55-4:15; Ex. A at 5:40-6:00.)
Officer Boardman observed "a rolled-up dollar bill on [Mr. Blythe's] lap, and also some
tin foil on the floor that [he] believed to be drug paraphernalia." (7/10/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-8.)
Officer Boardman ordered Mr. Blythe out of the car and searched his pockets, finding nothing of
evidentiary value. (7/10/18 Tr., p.11, L.21 - p.13, L.20; p.21, Ls.13-16; Ex. A at 0:40-1:00.)
Officer Boardman told Mr. Blythe, "Like I said, you're not under arrest-nothing like that,
right?" (Ex. A at 1:00-05.)
The officers then began searching Mr. Parent's vehicle, with Officer Fancuillo searching
the driver's side, and Officer Boardman searching the passenger's side. (7/10/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.21-
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22; Ex. B at 5:10-10:00.) While the officers were searching the vehicle, Mr. Blythe stood near
the front of the patrol car, not in handcuffs. (7/10/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-8.) Officer Fancuillo asked
Officer Boardman, "You got anything felony?" and Officer Boardman said, ''No." (7/10/18
Tr., p.24, Ls.21-25; Ex. A at 3:05-09; Ex. B at 5:35-41.) At some point, Officer Fancuillo found
marijuana in the driver's side of the vehicle, and Officer Boardman found "several . . . used
rolled-up pieces of tin foil with bum marks consistent with drug use," and one piece of tin foil
that he believed contained "a usable amount of heroin," though he never tested it. (7 /10/18
Tr., p.15, Ls.3-11, 17-19; p.16, Ls.4-5, p.17, Ls.17-21, p.23, Ls.20-23.) With respect to at least
one piece of foil, Officer Boardman told Officer Fancuillo, "It was in the back." (Ex. A at 9:2532.)
While Officer Boardman was still searching the vehicle, Officer Fancuillo asked him,
"What do you think?" and Officer Boardman answered, "In that one, there's ... at least a point.
He told me he smokes pills off tinfoil. I say we Mirandize them . . . . It's up to you." (Ex. A at
14:00-30.) The following exchange took place awhile later:
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]

How well did you check your guy?
Not. I did not. JustYou've got good reason to check him now.
Oh, yeah.
Take his shoes off
Yes.

(Ex. A at 15:40-55.) Officer Boardman did not immediately check Mr. Blythe, but continued
searching the vehicle. (Ex. A at 15:55-16:35.)
After he completed searching the vehicle, Officer Boardman walked back to where
Mr. Blythe was standing, and said, "Do me a favor, can you kick your shoes off for me?" (Ex. A
at 16:45-48; Tr., p.12, Ls.14-17.) Mr. Blythe kicked his shoes off, and Officer Boardman saw
two baggies that appeared to contain heroin. (7/10/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-18; Tr., p.12, Ls.17-18.)
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He said, "Dude, really?" (Ex. A at 17:00.) Officer Boardman then handcuffed Mr. Blythe,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and told him he was under arrest. (7/10/18 Tr., p.18, L.21 p.19, L.10; Tr., p.12, Ls.18-19; Ex. A at 17:10-20:05.)
Mr. Blythe was charged by Information with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.45-46.) Mr. Blythe filed a motion to suppress, arguing the
heroin found in his shoe should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, because the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement did not permit the officers to search his shoes. (R., pp.4752.) The prosecution filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Blythe's motion, arguing Officer
Boardman did not violate Mr. Blythe's rights by searching his shoes because Mr. Blythe
consented to a search of his shoes by removing them in response to the officer's request, and the
search of Mr. Blythe's shoes was a lawful search incident to arrest. (R., pp.56-59.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Blythe's motion to suppress, at which it heard
testimony from Officer Boardman, and admitted the recordings of the incident from Officer
Boardman' s and Officer Fancuillo' s on-body video cameras. (7 /10/18 Tr., p.29, L.8 - p.31, L.11;
Exs. A, B.) The parties argued the motion to suppress at a subsequent hearing, and the district
court denied the motion. (R., pp.85-86.) The district court first concluded Mr. Blythe did not
consent to a search of his shoes, but took his shoes off in response to a police directive.
(Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.14, L.24.) The district court next concluded the search was a lawful search
incident to arrest, distinguishing this case from State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017). (Tr., p.15, L.6
- p.17, L.5.)
Following the district court's ruling, Mr. Blythe entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion
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to suppress. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.19, L.25, p.27, L.4; R., pp.77-81.) The district court accepted
Mr. Blythe's guilty plea. (Tr., p.28, Ls.20-24.) The district court sentenced Mr. Blythe to a
unified term of four years, with two years fixed, then suspended the sentence and placed
Mr. Blythe on probation for two years. (Tr., p.44, Ls.11-16.) The judgment of conviction was
entered on March 14, 2019, and Mr. Blythe filed a timely notice of appeal on April 23, 2019.
(R., pp.100-11.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Blythe's motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Blythe's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court correctly concluded Mr. Blythe did not consent to Officer Boardman's

warrantless search of his shoes, but erred in concluding the search of his shoes was a lawful
search incident to his arrest. An objective review of the totality of the circumstances shows that,
prior to the search of Mr. Blythe's shoes, an arrest was not going to occur. That is, Mr. Blythe
would not have been arrested but for the discovery of heroin in his shoe. This was not a lawful
search incident to arrest under State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017).

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).

"This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found." Id. (citations omitted). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
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C.

The Warrantless Search Of Mr. Blythe's Shoes Violated His Rights Under The Fourth
Amendment Because Neither Of The Two Exceptions To The Warrant Requirement
Proffered By The Prosecution Applies

1.

Introduction

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded.
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,

846 (2004 ). "Searches conducted without a warrant are considered per se unreasonable unless
they fall into one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to this general
rule." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 815 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he
State has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement." State v. Islas, 442 P.3d 274, 282 (2019) (citation omitted).

2.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Mr. Blythe Did Not Consent To A Search
Of His Shoes

Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Wulff,
157 Idaho 416, 419 (2014). "Where the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the
burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497(1983). "The standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness-what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, the district court correctly
concluded Mr. Blythe did not consent to a search of his shoes.
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After searching Mr. Parent's vehicle, Officer Boardman walked back to where
Mr. Blythe was standing, and said, "Do me a favor, can you kick your shoes off for me?" (Ex. A
at 16:45-48; Tr., p.12, Ls.14-17.) Mr. Blythe kicked his shoes off, and Officer Boardman saw
two baggies that appeared to contain heroin. (7/10/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-18; Tr., p.12, Ls.17-18.)
He said, "Dude, really?" (Ex. A at 17:00.) Officer Boardman then handcuffed Mr. Blythe,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and told him he was under arrest. (7 /10/18 Tr., p.18, L.21 p.19, L.10; Tr., p.12, Ls.18-19; Ex. A at 17:10-20:05.)
The district court concluded Officer Boardman's statement to Mr. Blythe to "kick your
shoes off' was a directive, as it "was not a situation where ... [the officer] was really giving
Mr. Blythe the option of kicking off his shoe or not kicking off his shoe." (Tr., p.12, L.21-p.13,
L.3.) The district court explained, "It's not optional. It's just a polite way of directing that person
to do something about which they have no option but to comply, really." (Tr., p.13, Ls.8-11.)
The district court rejected the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Blythe voluntarily consented to the
search. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-20.) The district court noted that, at the time of the directive, Mr. Blythe's
identification had been taken; Mr. Blythe had twice asked for permission to smoke a cigarette;
the patrol car's red and blue lights were flashing at all times; and the driver was handcuffed in
the back ofthe patrol car. (Tr., p.13, L.19-p.14, L.1.)
The district court correctly concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proving
the search of Mr. Blythe's shoes was consensual. See Islas, 442 Pd.3d at 282 (stating "the State
has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement") (citation omitted). Thus, the district court correctly concluded the warrantless
search of Mr. Blythe's shoes did not fall within the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
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3.

The District Court Erred In Concluding The Search Of Mr. Blythe's Shoes Was A
Lawful Search Incident To His Arrest

"Searches incident to arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant
requirement." State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835,838 (2004) (citations omitted). "Pursuant to the
search incident to arrest exception, law enforcement officers may search an arrestee incident to a
lawful custodial arrest." Lee, 162 Idaho at 649 (citations omitted). Here, the district court
concluded the search of Mr. Blythe's shoes was a lawful search incident to arrest, because "there
was probable cause for him to be arrested even leading up to the point where he kicked off his
shoes .... " (Tr., p.16, Ls.22-24.) A search incident to probable cause is not an exception to the
warrant requirement. The district court's reasoning is contrary to our Supreme Court's holding in
Lee that "[t]he reasonableness of a search is determined by the totality of the circumstances, and
a search incident to arrest is not reasonable when an arrest is not going to occur." Lee, 162 Idaho
at 652.
There was little suspicion directed at Mr. Blythe prior to the discovery of the heroin in his
shoe. Mr. Parent, the driver and owner of the vehicle, admitted early on that he had seven grams
of marijuana, and he was handcuffed immediately. (Ex.Bat 2:25-45; 7/10/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.1216, p.22, Ls.11-25.) Officer Boardman observed what he believed to be drug paraphernalia on
Mr. Blythe's lap while he was still in the car, but did not handcuff Mr. Blythe, and specifically
told him he was "not under arrest." (7/10/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-8; Ex. A at 1:00-05.) Officer
Boardman found what he believed to be "a usable amount of heroin" in a piece of tin foil under
the passenger seat while he was searching the vehicle, but it is clear from the totality of the
circumstances that he was not going to arrest Mr. Blythe on that basis. (7/10/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.311; p.16, Ls.4-5, p.17, Ls.17-21.)
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Officer Fancuillo asked Officer Boardman, “What do you think?” and Officer Boardman
answered, “I say we Mirandize them . . . . It’s up to you.” (Ex. A at 14:00-30.) Officer
Boardman did not take any actions that would objectively indicate an intent to arrest Mr. Blythe.
He did not place Mr. Blythe in handcuffs; he did not tell him he was under arrest; he did not call
for backup; he did not secure Mr. Blythe in the patrol car; he did not draw his weapon. See
Joshua Deahl, Debunking Pre-Arrest Incident Searches, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1118 (2018)
(discussing the pre-search indicia of arrest).
While he was still searching the car, Officer Boardman had the following conversation
with Officer Fancuillo:
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]
[Officer Fancuillo]
[Officer Boardman]

How well did you check your guy?
Not. I did not. Just—
You’ve got good reason to check him now.
Oh, yeah.
Take his shoes off.
Yes.

(Ex. A at 15:40-55.) After searching the vehicle for another minute, Officer Boardman walked
back to where Mr. Blythe was standing, and directed him to take off his shoes. (Ex. A at 16:4548; Tr., p.12, Ls.14-17.) After observing the heroin, Officer Boardman handcuffed Mr. Blythe,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and told him he was under arrest. (7/10/18 Tr., p.18, L.21 –
p.19, L.10; Tr., p.12, Ls.18-19; Ex. A at 17:10-20:05.)
Counsel for Mr. Blythe argued in the district court that Mr. Blythe “wouldn’t have been
arrested” absent the discovery of the drugs in his shoe. (Tr., p.7, Ls.19-21.) He pointed out that
until Officer Boardman found heroin in Mr. Blythe’s shoe, “[the driver] is the one that admitted
that there was marijuana in the vehicle,” was “the one that handed the marijuana to [the officer],”
and was “the one that was handcuffed and sitting in the back of the cop car.” (Tr., p.9, L.21 –
p.10, L.3.) “So I don’t think it’s reasonable to assume that Mr. Blythe would have been arrested
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anyway because of some tinfoil that had been found in the passenger side area." (Tr., p.8, Ls.912.) The prosecutor candidly acknowledged he had not reviewed Lee, and argued simply that
"[s]o long as that arrest happens a short time after that probable cause develops, a search incident
to arrest can take place either before or after a formal arrest." (Tr., p.10, Ls.13-24.)
The district court read Lee to mean it could not "[speculate] about what may or may not
have happened depending on the rest of the circumstances that might have developed at the
scene of this case for Mr. Blythe as to whether he would or would not have been ultimately
arrested." (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-7.) But this is not entirely correct. The Lee Court instructs that courts
are to determine from the totality of the circumstances whether an arrest is going to occur prior
to a search. 162 Idaho at 652. The Lee Court explained:
We determine if an arrest is going to occur based on the totality of the
circumstances, including the officer's statements. While the subjective intent of
an officer is usually not relevant in Fourth Amendment analysis, statements made
by the officer of his intentions along with other objective facts are relevant in the
totality of circumstances as to whether an arrest is to occur. If an arrest does not
occur, and objectively the totality of the circumstances show an arrest is not going
to occur, an officer cannot justify a warrantless search based on the search
incident to arrest exception.
Id.
Here, the district court did not consider whether an arrest was going to occur based on the
totality of the circumstances. Instead, the district court found the search of Mr. Blythe's shoes
was permissible because, prior to the search, the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Blythe
"for frequenting a place where drugs were found, for possession of a controlled substance, [and]
for possession of paraphernalia." (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-16.) The district court explained, "This Court
finds that there was probable cause for him to be arrested even leading up to the point where he
kicked off his shoes based on what the Court saw in this video and heard from the witness."
(Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.1.)
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The fact that there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Blythe prior to the search of his shoes
does not resolve the question of whether the search of his shoes was a lawful search incident to
arrest. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Lee, Officer Laurenson had probable cause to
arrest Mr. Lee for driving without privileges prior to the search of the items found in his pocket.
162 Idaho at 651. The critical question is not whether there was probable cause for an arrest, but
whether an arrest would have in fact occurred. See id. at 651-52. "Bootstrapping evidence found
in a search 'incident to arrest'-based on probable cause for only a minor violation that would
otherwise not result in an arrest-so that the fruits of a search incident to arrest themselves
provide the justification for the arrest, is not permissible." United States v. Davis, 111 F. Supp.
3d 323, 334 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
Here, the State did not meet its burden of proving the facts necessary to establish the
search of Mr. Blythe's shoes was a lawful search incident to arrest. See Islas, 442 Pd.3d at 282
(stating "the State has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception to the
warrant requirement") (citation omitted). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, which the
district court declined to do, the objective facts indicate Mr. Blythe would not have been arrested
but for the discovery of the drugs in his shoe. As such, the search of his shoes was not a lawful
search incident to his arrest under Lee, and the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Blythe respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 29 th day of July, 2019.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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